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NOTE
THE RIGHT TO WEAR HEADSCARVES AND
OTHER RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN FRENCH,
TURKISH, AND AMERICAN SCHOOLS: HOW
THE GOVERNMENT DRAWS A VEIL ON
FREE EXPRESSION OF FAITH
ORIANA MAZZAt
INTRODUCTION
In the school context, the right to manifest belief by wearing
religious symbols, especially the Muslim headscarf-or hijab-
can often be threatened. This is burdensome when the adherent
has a sincerely held belief that wearing certain garb is required
by a given religion, as it can lead to great tension between the
person's duty to God and his or her duty to follow the laws set
forth by the government. It is especially tense in countries like
Turkey and France, which have official policies of secularism,
and even in the United States, which has a policy of separation of
church and state.' A major world issue today is the extent to
which women have the right to wear a Muslim headscarf-or
hijab. In schools, the issue is paramount because the hijab
symbolizes different things to different people, and some
governments ascribe a meaning to the headscarf from which they
wish to protect schoolgirls.
France banned the headscarf along with other "conspicuous"
religious symbols in primary and secondary schools in
t Articles Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D., 2008, Dean's List , St. John's
University School of Law; B.A., 2004, summa cum laude, St. John's University. The
author wishes to thank Professor Mark L. Movsesian for his insight and guidance.
1 See generally T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and LaYcit& A Comparison
of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 420-24 (2004) [hereinafter
Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicit ] (discussing the similarities and differences
between the French concept of laicitg and the policy of separation of church and
state in the United States).
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controversial Law No. 2004-228, passed in 2004.2 Turkey has a
long-standing ban on the hijab in schools and government
buildings, which was upheld by the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECHR") in Sahin v. Turkey.' The U.S. has no such ban
against hijab, which would almost undoubtedly fail First
Amendment scrutiny.4 The right to wear hijab is sometimes
2 Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la R~publique
Franqaise [JO.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p.5190; see also Nicole
Atwill, Implementation of Head Scarves Law, 12 WORLD L. BULL. 15, 15-16 (2004),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/wlb/index.html (follow "December 2004"
hyperlink) (discussing the contents of French Law No. 2004-228 of March 15, 2004,
as well as some of the practical effects of the law).
I 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173.
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing the right to free exercise of religion).
A law that specifically targets student religious dress would be subject to strict
scrutiny. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990), superseded by
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997). This would make it very difficult for such a law to pass constitutional
muster. A parallel can be drawn between this and religious garb statutes that ban
teachers from wearing hijab or other religious articles. In those cases, the shaky
ground for the compelling interest is avoiding teacher proselytization; several courts
have said that a blanket ban on certain garb is narrowly tailored. Some states in the
U.S. restrict the wearing of religious garb by teachers under statutes that originated
to prevent priests and nuns from teaching at public schools. For example, the Third
Circuit denied the claim of a Pennsylvania teacher who was prevented from teaching
class in hijab under such a statute. See United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882,
894 (3d Cir. 1990). Oregon upheld a state religious garb law when it was challenged
by a Sikh teacher who had been suspended for wearing a turban to school. See
Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 41, 723 P.2d 298, 381 (Or. 1986). Switzerland's ban
on the hijab as worn by public school teachers was upheld by the ECHR in Dahlab v.
Switzerland, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 431 (2001), available at http://echr.coe.intlechr
(follow "Case-Law" hyperlink; then follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; then select
"HUDOC Collection" check block at upper-left corner; then enter "Dahlab v.
Switzerland" in "Case Title" field; then select "Search" option). This case is
distinguishable from the French law, as the court was concerned with the
proselytizing effect teachers wearing such garb may have on students. The ECHR
upholds the rights of European countries to create laws protecting against
proselytization. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 17 Eur. H.R. Rep. 397,
411-12 (1993). The U.S. does not have the same anti-proselytization laws as Europe,
and free expression of religion is highly valued in the U.S., so it is inconsistent that
it has been held constitutional to prevent the wearing of a religious symbol that does
not somehow threaten the public order or safety. The possibility that a teacher
wearing a religious symbol would give the students a sense of the teacher's beliefs
and encourage students to ask questions about them should not be considered
sufficient reason to disallow the practice. Such a case is very different from the
school or teacher actively proselytizing or sponsoring prayer. See Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (holding school-sponsored prayer unconstitutional).
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impinged upon, however, by various religiously neutral policies5
and school dress codes.6
The crux of the hijab debate is whether wearing it is a
human right and to what extent, and for what reasons, the
government may ban it. Part I of this Article will discuss the
backdrop of the hijab debate: why women historically have worn
it and what it means to both Muslims and outsiders. Part II
examines how France's unique history led to its ban of hijab.
Part III discusses the ban in secular Turkey, where an ongoing
war over the issue continues with the Turkish high courts
overturning recent attempts by the legislature to remove the ban
in universities.7 This Section gives particular attention to the
ECHR's Sahin decision and where its logic faltered. Part IV
shows that while the U.S. does not have a nationwide ban, this
issue comes up in schools more than we might realize. This
Section explains how the Supreme Court's shift to the neutral
and generally applicable test of Employment Division v. Smith'
in 1990, has left open the possibility of infringing on the right to
wear headscarves and suggests the standard under which courts
should scrutinize school policies that burden students' freedom to
wear religious symbols.
I. THE MEANING OF THE HIJAB
"Hijab" can be a generic term for modest dress in general,
but in this Article, it will refer to the most common type of
Muslim headscarf-one that is loosely tied around the neck to
cover only the neck and hair.9 It is distinguishable from the
chador, a full body cloak that leaves the face uncovered; the
In 2008, a Muslim woman in Douglasville, Georgia, was jailed for contempt of
court after refusing to remove a hijab in a municipal courthouse where head
coverings were prohibited by the judge; upon her release, the judge and police
officers were ordered to undergo sensitivity training. See Josh Levs, Police To Get
Training After Head-Scarf Wearer's Arrest, CNN.COM, Dec. 23, 2008, http:l
www.cnn.com/2008/JS/12/22/georgia.muslim.courthouse/.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 119-121.
' See Court Annuls Turkish Scarf Reform, BBC NEWS, June 5, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7438348.stm.
8 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
' See In Graphics: Muslim Veils, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
shared/spl/hi/pop-.ups/05/europemuslim-veils/html/1.stm (last visited Apr. 5, 2009)
(describing and depicting different forms of Muslim veil).
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niqab, which covers everything but the eyes; and the burqa,
which covers the entire face and body, leaving only a mesh screen
in front of the eyes.1° Some countries make wearing some form of
hijab, including the full burqa, mandatory under Sharia law.11
Those laws are only germane to this Article to the extent that the
forced wearing of a veil brings to mind oppression of women in
the eyes of many Westerners. In an attempt to separate
themselves from that model, some countries with large Muslim
populations go to the opposite extreme: banning the hijab
altogether in certain government buildings and schools. Bans in
the schools create problems because in most countries some
amount of schooling is compulsory,12 and under most treaties
education is a human right. 13 When something the student
considers fundamental to her belief is banned in the school, she
can be cut off from access to education, or at least forced to make
a difficult choice between education and the religious belief.
Proponents of these bans argue that the bans are actually
protecting girls from making this difficult choice; the girls do not
have to fight against males who would force them to wear hijab,
and they can be free from this pressure when at school. This
logic is flawed because many girls may instead end up leaving
school altogether because of the bans. This is surely more
harmful to girls who are truly susceptible to male oppression at
home, as they will then lack the empowerment that education
provides. Besides, the pressure to wear the veil will rear its head
at home or in other parts of the community regardless of whether
students may wear the hijab to school. It is the case, therefore,
that hijab bans create the same type of repressive anti-female
feelings and fear of the "others" in the outside world that are
prevalent in countries like Iran, which force the wearing of the
veil. In both cases, the female is marginalized, not trusted to
make her own decisions, and given a message that another
culture is wrong. "Veiled countries," which mandate headscarves
10 See id.
11 See A Look at the Wearing of Veils, and Disputes on the Issue, Across the
Muslim World, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 31, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/ap/2006/10/31/africa/MEGENMideastVeilGlance.php.
12 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (recognizing the power
of governments to compel education).
13 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res 44/25, art. 28, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989), available at http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/44/a44r025.htm.
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for all, argue that they are trying to protect women from the
immorality of the non-Muslim West, and hijab-banning countries
argue that they are protecting women from the sexist clutches of
Islam. 4 Neither rubric respects the intelligence of the woman,
which is especially sad in the school context, where pluralism
should be valued.
Some Muslims feel that their religion compels them to wear
hijab because of certain verses in the Koran, Islam's holiest
scripture.' 5 The word "hijab" means "modesty" in Arabic, and
wearing of hijab includes conservative clothing along with the
headscarf.1 6  Hair is fetishized in Islamic culture-to cover a
woman's hair is to cover her sexuality, keeping it under control
so that she can keep it for the pleasure of only her husband
without provoking lustful thoughts in other men.7 For those
who believe it is obligatory, it becomes so at puberty, serving to
indicate to the world that although she is now of child-bearing
years, the woman is not sexually available."8 This may be why in
Turkey, where the headscarf is banned in primary and secondary
schools, students are typically required to attend school only
until fifth grade; the peasant girls who are most likely to desire
to wear hijab do not protest because they rarely finish school
14 See Sebastian Poulter, Muslim Headscarves in School: Contrasting Legal
Approaches in England and France, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 47 (1997) (noting
that some people believe certain activities, such as polygamy and female genital
mutilation, so depart from minimum Western standards of acceptable behavior that
it is proper to intervene in minority cultures to fight them).
15 See id. at 45; see also Mohamed Baianonie, Imam, Friday Speech Delivered at
the Islamic Center of Raleigh, N.C. (Jan. 15, 1988), http://islaml.org/khutub/
Hijab.htm. The issue of whether or not the Koran does in fact mandate hijab is not
germane to this Article. It has not been disputed that this is a sincerely held
religious belief by those who have taken legal action against the bans, which is all
that matters in American and European jurisprudence.
16 See Norma Claire Moruzzi, A Problem with Headscarves: Contemporary
Complexities of Political and Social Identity, 22 POL. THEORY 653, 655 (1994).
17 See Carol Delaney, Untangling the Meanings of Hair in Turkish Society, 67
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 159, 161, 164 (1994). This should not be a radical notion to
anyone familiar with the other Abrahamic religions. In Orthodox Judaism, some
women cover their heads to indicate that they are married. See Adin Steinsaltz, Hats
and Covering the Head: A Traditionalist View, MYJEwISHLEARNING.COM, http:ll
www.myjewishlearning.com/daily-life/TheBody/ClothingHeadcoverings.htm (last
visited Mar. 16, 2009). There are analogous remnants of this in Christianity as well,
including the nun's habit, the wedding veil, and the belief of some that the head
should be covered by a hat or scarf in church.
18 See Delaney, supra note 17, at 161, 164.
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anyway. 9 This system further alienates these women from the
public education system. The beauty of the rebellion of women
such as Leyla Sahin, who fought Turkey's ban in the ECHR, is
that it represents a movement by women who are educated and
fighting for their right to "own" the hijab, making it a symbol of
female empowerment rather than male domination. Indeed,
some Muslim scholars argue that the purpose of the veiling
during the time of Muslim prophet Mohammed was to protect
women, and that in today's society, education is the equivalent to
the headscarf because it helps women protect themselves.2 °
Some Muslim women do not wear hijab out of a sense of duty
but prefer to wear it as a political or cultural symbol. The first
woman ever elected to the Turkish legislature, Merve Kavacki,
commented that "Ib]y covering themselves, Muslim women can
be recognized not only for their religious beliefs but for their
contributions to society as well; they can be judged for their
"121 lsintellect and not just their appearance. She lost her position
and her Turkish citizenship for wearing the hijab in a
government building.22 The bans on hijab in Turkey and France
may have only made women more determined to wear it. In
February 2008, a newly elected Turkish legislature voted
11 Id. at 167; see also FED. RES. DIVISION, LIB. CONG., TURKEY: A COUNTRY
STUDY (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1995), available at http://countrystudies.us/turkey/
50.htm (noting that middle school education is also compulsory, but is rarely
enforced in rural areas, and thus "it is easier for parents to keep older children,
especially girls, at home").
20 See Bahia Tahzib-Lie, Applying a Gender Perspective in the Area of the Right
to Freedom of Religion or Belief, 2000 BYU L. REV. 967, 977 n.44 (2000).
21 Merve Kavakci, Headscarf Heresy: For One Muslim Woman, the Headscarf is
a Matter of Choice and Dignity, 142 FOREIGN POLY 66, 66-67 (2004) [hereinafter
Kavakci, Headscarf Heresy]. Kavakci argues that while some women in Islamic
countries are coerced into wearing the veil, others choose it of their own free will, so
Western feminists often "impose... prejudice[]" on them when they complain about
hijab. See id.
22 See id. at 66. Kavakci and her family moved to the United States, where she
became a professor at the George Washington University. See Clayton McCleskey,
GW Professor Merve Kavakci: A Modern-day Pilgrim, GW HATCHET, Nov. 24, 2008,
available at http://media.www.gwhatchet.com/media/storage/paper332/news/2008/
11/24/Life/Slice.Of.Life.Gw.Professor.Merve.Kavakci.A.ModernDay.Pilgrim-3559559
.shtml. Within two years of the incident, the Turkish government shut down her
former political party, deeming it a threat to the secular state. See Kavakci,
Headscarf Heresy, supra note 21.
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overwhelmingly to lift the ban in universities,23 but this statute
was invalidated by the courts and caused much political unrest
in Turkey.24
II. THE BAN IN FRANCE
La~citg, the French notion of secularism, stands as one of the
cornerstones of the French republic. 25 The idea behind la~citg is
to promote tolerance under a model that separates church from
state, so that no religion will be favored over another and church-
state conflict can be avoided.26 The Law on the Separation
between Church and State is found in the Act of 9 December
1905 and states that: "The Republic... shall guarantee free
participation in religious worship [unless such participation
interferes with] the interest of public order."27 Latcit was born
out of Enlightenment thinking, which presented religion as
dogmatic and intolerant.2  To the French, the classic values of
equality, fraternity, and liberty support a notion that ethnic and
religious distinctions are relegated to the private sphere by
design.29 Immigrants are welcome as long as they are seen as
becoming "French"-they are even offered French language and
culinary appreciation courses.3 0  This presents a problem for
many French-Muslim immigrants, because Islam is a way of life
that permeates the mundane through dietary laws, styles of
2 See Dorian Jones, Turkey Moves To Lift Ban on Headscarves at Universities,
VOICE OF AMERICA, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-
02/2008-02-09-voa3.cfm?CFID=13435284&CFTOKEN=53779731.
24 See infra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
25 See Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicit6, supra note 1, at 428.
26 See id. at 429.
27 See Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 18 (Dec. 4, 2008),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (follow "Case Law" hyperlink; then follow
"HUDOC" hyperlink; then search "Application Number" for "27058/05"; then follow
the Word Document hyperlink) (citing Law on the Separation of Churches and the
State of Dec. 9, 1905, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Franqaise [JO.] [Official
Gazette of France], Dec. 11, 1905, p.7205) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28 See Dominique Custos, Secularism in French Public Schools: Back to War?
The French Statute of March 15, 2004, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 337, 345-46 (2006).
29 See Poulter, supra note 14, at 50.
0 See Christina A. Baker, Note, French Headscarves and the U.S. Constitution:
Parents, Children, and Free Exercise of Religion, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 341,
343 (2007). In 1990, the French government created the Council for the Reflection of
Islam to help integrate Muslims into French society. See Cynthia DeBula Baines,
Note, L'Affaire des Foulards-Discrimination, or the Price of a Secular Public
Education System?, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 303, 312-13 (1996).
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dress, daily prayer rituals, and so on.31  In some Muslim
countries, what is "of the world" is considered sinful compared to
what is "of Islam," so it may be quite the culture shock when
their citizens immigrate to France.
President Jacques Chirac signed the French ban on students
wearing conspicuous religious symbols into law on March 14,
2004.32 Soon thereafter, the U.S. Commission on International
Religious Freedom opined that with this ban, France was
probably violating the European Convention on Human Rights. 3
The ECHR has yet to hear a case on the French law, but there is
strong evidence to suggest that the court would uphold it.3 4 The
court noted the existence of the law, without condemnation, in
Sahin, discussing it among the laws of other European countries,
some of which allow the hijab and some of which do not. This
was part of a greater point about the wide latitude countries
should have in decision making as part of the "margin of
appreciation," which it considered especially appropriate with
respect to wearing religious symbols. 5 In fact, in 2008, the Court
held in Dogru v. France36 that there was no violation of Article 9
of the European Convention, which provides for the right to
manifest one's religious beliefs,37 when Belgin Dogru was
31 See Baines, supra note 30, at 311.
3'2 The law states, as translated: "In public elementary schools, junior high
schools and high schools, students are prohibited from wearing symbols or clothing
through which they conspicuously evince a religious affiliation. The internal
regulations [of the schools] require disciplinary procedures to be preceded by a
dialogue with the student." Custos, supra note 28, at 360 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
33 Press Release, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, France:
Proposed Bill May Violate Freedom of Religion (Feb. 3, 2004), available at http:ll
www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=318&Itemid=51
("The French government and legislature should be urged to reassess this initiative
in light of its international obligations to ensure that every person in France is
guaranteed the freedom to manifest his or her religion or belief in public, or not to do
so."); see also Baker, supra note 30, at 341.
34 See Kathryn Boustead, The French Headscarf Law Before the European Court
of Human Rights, 16 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 167, 189-96 (2007) (analyzing a
hypothetical ECHR case on the French ban and concluding that the ECHR would
probably find it an interference with manifestation of religion that is justifiable
under the same legitimate aims of maintaining public order and protecting the
rights of others that were considered in Sahin).
'5 See Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 204 para. 110.
36 App. No. 27058/05 (2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (follow
"Case Law" hyperlink; then follow "HUDOC" hyperlink; then search "Application
Number" for "27058/05"; then follow the Word Document hyperlink).
3" Id. para. 72.
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expelled from a French school for wearing a headscarf during
physical education ("P.E.") and sports classes.3 ' This case is not
exactly on point, as the French law bans religious symbols from
all classrooms, not just P.E. classrooms, where there is a more
reasonable need to disallow headscarves. The opinion in Dogru,
however, discussed the law in approbatory terms and can be
interpreted as granting broad support for it.
Dogru's allegations were based on events that occurred in
1999, before the French law of 2004 was enacted, when she was
eleven years old.3 9 A teacher reported her to the headmaster
when she refused to remove her scarf in P.E. class. Dogru was
subsequently expelled for breaching the duty of assiduity because
she failed to actively participate in class.4 ° On appeal, the
Director of Education for Caen and the Caen Administrative
Court upheld the school's decision, the latter finding that Dogru's
"attitude had created an atmosphere of tension within the
school."41 The Nantes Administrative Court of Appeal and the
Conseil d'Etat, the highest administrative court in France, each
rejected an appeal as well.42 The expulsion was upheld despite
the girl's proposal to wear a hat or balaclava 43 instead of a
headscarf.44 The ECHR said that she "willfully infringed"45 upon
school rules and that her proposed compromise was not enough,
especially since the school had attempted to open up a dialogue
with her.46  The use of the word dialogue is misleading. The
ECHR noted that under French law, when there is a conflict
regarding religious garb in school, teachers should immediately
seek a dialogue with the student and his or her parents; this
"dialogue," according to a 1989 circular by the Minister for
38 Id. para. 8.
39 See id. para. 6.
40 See id. paras. 7-8.
41 Id. paras. 10-13.
42 Id. paras. 14-16.
A balaclava is a tight wool cap that covers the whole head and can leave the
face uncovered, similar to a ski mask. See Balaclava (clothing), http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Skimask (redirect to Balaclava (clothing)) (last visited Jan. 8, 2009). The
item has no loose pieces that could cause asphyxiation or get in the way of physical
activity, therefore, there is no safety reason for a school not to allow its use during
P.E. class. In fact, a balaclava is commonly used in a variety of athletic endeavors.
See id.
See Dogru, App. No. 27058/05, para. 13.
45 Id. para. 38.
4 See id. para. 39.
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Education, shall be implemented so that "the pupil agrees to stop
wearing the sign(s) in question."47 Thus, the dialogue appears to
be a pretext for bullying the student and parents into giving up
their argument. The school argued, and the court agreed, that
because it made a conciliatory effort and allowed her to wear
scarves in regular classes, Dogru should have compromised by
not wearing a head covering during P.E.4" Certainly, the health
and safety concerns regarding the wearing of a loosely tied
headscarf in a P.E. class are legitimate. This position is
culturally insensitive, however, because to some pubescent
Muslim girls, appearing in public without a head covering is akin
to being naked, which is a compromise on modesty that the
devout are not willing to make. Dogru's willingness to wear a
hat instead of a headscarf demonstrates that this was an issue of
modesty for her, not an attempt to foist a political symbol onto
others or otherwise interfere with school activities, as the court
implies.49 A hat is not a conspicuous religious symbol, nor would
it evince any religious belief, so it cannot have constituted an act
of pressure or proselytism.
The court also noted that there was a public order
disturbance and a "general atmosphere of tension' ' 50 because the
incident caused some teachers to strike in defense of secularism,
even though the disorder originated with the teachers and the
student "had not engaged in any form of proselytism." 1 In
deciding that Dogru's right to manifest her religious beliefs had
not been infringed, the court explained that "an attitude which
fails to respect that principle [of secularism] will not necessarily
be accepted as being covered by the freedom to manifest one's
religion and will not enjoy the protection of Article 9 of the
Convention. '52  The court correctly noted that it was not
unreasonable to make a student remove the headscarf during
sport activities and stated that the expulsion was "merely" the
consequence of Dogru's non-compliance with the rules and not of
"' See id. para. 27.
' See id. para. 39.
" See id. ("Apart from the disruption of physical education and sports classes,
the authorities had legitimate grounds to fear that the pupil's behaviour would
interfere with order in the school or the normal functioning of the State education
service.").
o Id. para. 74.
51 Id. para. 44.
52 Id. para. 72.
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her religious convictions. 3 This view is overly simplistic given
that expulsion from school is a very serious consequence.
Moreover, since the girl said that she would wear a hat instead of
a headscarf, it does, in fact, appear that she was punished for her
religious conviction that her head must be covered in public. The
court brushed off deciding whether the school was unreasonable
as to the student's proposed compromise, stating simply that it
fell into the "margin of appreciation" enjoyed by the state. 4 The
court also held that Dogru had not been deprived of her right to
education under Article 2 of the Convention because she had
completed her education through correspondence courses and, in
any case, the right to education does not prohibit disciplining a
student who fails to follow the rules because schools have the
power to "develop[] and mouldU ... the character and mental
powers of its pupils."55
The language used by the ECHR indicates a likelihood of
support for the French law in its entire application, not just in
the limited area of physical education classes. The court focused
on the headscarf as a disruption that causes tension in school
without really discussing the numerous practical reasons why a
headscarf would be dangerous in a P.E. class, such as its
potential to cause asphyxiation or trip up a student. This implies
that the ECHR was more concerned with broader issues
involving religious symbols in schools-the same issues that
inform the French law. This allowed the court to demonstrate
support for the controversial law without actually issuing a
decision on it.
The French law allows students to wear inconspicuous
symbols such as small Stars of David and crosses or crucifixes,
but not items such as a yarmulke, hijab, or turban, which are
material to the Jewish, Muslim, and Sikh faiths. This suggests
that France bears an animus towards these religions.
Specifically, the feeling among some spectators is that the law
represents anti-Islamic beliefs.56 France, reportedly, has the
highest Muslim population in all of Europe and tensions within
Id. para. 73.
See id. para. 75.
See id. paras. 79-83.
6 See Baker, supra note 30, at 341 (summarizing international press reactions,
which characterize the ban as anti-Islamic).
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the community are high.5  Muslims in France face high
unemployment rates leading to ghettoization in housing, which
fuels fundamentalism and unites the Muslims in their religion,
rather than integrating them into French culture.58
The lobbying effort behind the law supports the notion that
the French law is anti-Islamic in nature. A group of female
French philosophers sent an open letter to President Chirac
supporting the ban, claiming that "the Islamic veil sends us all-
Muslim and non-Muslim-back to a discrimination against
women that is intolerable,"59 which suggests that a voluntary
manifestation of belief in a major world religion can symbolize
discrimination. Feelings about the headscarf are no doubt fueled
by reactions to l'affaire du foulard ("the affair of the
headscarves"), a 1989 incident in which three Muslim girls were
suspended from a French public secondary school in the town of
Creil for wearing headscarves but were eventually readmitted to
class by the national Minister of Education.6" The Minister
suspended the girls because he was concerned with the assertion
of religious rights by other minorities, including Jews who were
absent from classes on Saturdays.6' L'affaire sparked national
debate, pitting right-wing politicians who were concerned about
fundamentalist Islam against liberals who were split between
support for the girls and feelings that a secular school system
could "save[]" the girls from the oppression of hijab.62 Polls from
1989 show that many French thought the headscarf was a
symbol of "conquering Islam" and that the education ministry
was too soft on the issue; they believed this "amount[ed] almost
to the abandonment of its duty to protect secular French culture
," See Baines, supra note 30, at 313 (noting also that in 1995, the French
government officially recognized Islam as the country's second largest religion after
Catholicism).
I See id. at 313-14 (detailing many incidents of racially and religiously driven
violence in the Muslim majority, former French colony of Algeria, causing fear of
Muslim fundamentalism in France).
," See Kavakci, Headscarf Heresy, supra note 21, at 67 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
60 See Moruzzi, supra note 16, at 653, 657-58.
6 See Poulter, supra note 14, at 57.
62 See id.
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and identity."6 3 The incident caused riots in France, emphasizing
the line that divides Muslim immigrants from the rest of French
society.64
It is surprising to know that after l'affaire, several French
court cases struck down school and university bans on religious
insignia in general and hijab in particular.6 5 For instance, the
Conseil d'Etat struck down a blanket ban by a school district on
the wearing of "any distinctive religious sign" because the terms
of the ban were too general.66 The Conseil also struck down
penalties for wearing headscarves in school where the school
could not establish that wearing the headscarves constituted "an
act of pressure or proselytism or [some other interference with]
public order."67 When France asked the Conseil for an opinion,
the court responded that wearing religious garb in school is
"not ... incompatible with the principle of secularism" as long
as these expressions of faith do not "constitute a form of
pressure, provocation, proselytism or propaganda" "in the
circumstances in which they are worn;" the court further noted
that religious symbols may be subject to rules only "if
necessary."" The court left it up to schools to determine their
own policies and decide whether an individual incident
constitutes such an act.69 The recent French law, which bans any
symbols that immediately identify the wearer's religious
affiliation,7" implies that items that evince a religious affiliation
in and of themselves constitute such pressure, proselytism, or
propaganda.71 Indeed, proselytization through such symbols is
63 Pierre Br~chon & Subrata Kumar Mitra, The National Front in France: The
Emergence of an Extreme Right Protest Movement, 25 COMP. POL. 63, 76-77 (1992).
6 See Baines, supra note 30, at 324-25 (suggesting that French Muslims, like
French Catholics, should get state funding for their own private religious schools
where girls can wear hijab without incident).
65 See Poulter, supra note 14, at 60 (discussing the cases).
66 See Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 29 (Dec. 4, 2008),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng (follow "Case Law" hyperlink; then follow
"HUDOC" hyperlink; then search "Application Number" for "27058/05"; then follow
the Word Document hyperlink).
67 Id.
I Id. para. 26.
69 See id. para. 56; see also Cindy Skach, International Decisions, Sahin v.
Turkey; Teacher Headscarf Case, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 186, 191 (2006).
70 Dogru, App. No. 27058/05 at paras. 30-31.
71 See id. para. 29.
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one of the official reasons given for passing the law.72 In this
way, the French legislature subverts the intentions behind the
Conseil's decisions, which afforded greater protection to the right
of Muslim schoolgirls to wear hijab precisely because
circumstances may vary.
As the French legislature considered passing the law, Chirac
commissioned a report from French Ombudsman Bernard Stasi,
who found in favor of banning the expression of religious or
political beliefs in schools.73 At least one member of the Stasi
Commission reported that it had originally planned to affirm the
findings of the Conseil d'Etat, but its members were moved by
the stories of women who testified at the hearings-Algerian
immigrants, for example, reported that when they came to
France they enjoyed having the freedom not to wear headscarves
but later felt a lot of pressure from husbands and brothers to do
so.74 Commission members also responded to testimony from
women who claimed they were subjected to physical attacks in
French-Muslim ghettos for choosing not to wear the headscarf.
One story came from Samira Bellil, who became a local celebrity
after writing a book about being gang-raped by young Muslim
males who objected to her modern style of dress.7" The
Commission concluded that "the country needed a political
answer to what appeared to be a political threat" and passed the
statute in 2004.76 Forty-eight students were expelled for wearing
religious symbols during the first academic semester after the
law's enactment. 77
72 See Poulter, supra note 14, at 61 (discussing laws that were previously
suggested).
73 See Boustead, supra note 34, at 189.
14 See Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, The French Headscarf Case: Why Girls
Cannot Legally Wear Headscarves in French Public Schools 3 (July 10, 2006)
(unpublished seminar paper, on file with author).
75 See Steven G. Gey, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the
French Approach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1,
14-16 (2005).
The new French law banning headscarves in public schools must be
understood in part as a response to these attacks on Muslim women in the
banlieues-attacks that are fueled by hopelessness, poverty, and a
generally violent atmosphere, as well as by a culture informed by the strict
sexual mores of religious fundamentalists.
Id.
76 Dutheillet de Lamothe, supra note 74, at 4.
77 Boustead, supra note 34, at 189.
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Reactions to the law have been mixed. One commentator
said that what is going on in France currently is a type of
"fundamentalist... laecism," driven by "illiberal and somewhat
Islamophobic" principles.71 On the other hand, sixty-nine percent
of French citizens support the law, including forty-two percent of
French Muslims. 9 This did not, however, stop segments of the
French Muslim population from rioting in 2005 because of the
disenfranchisement they felt over issues such as the headscarf
ban and unemployment conditions.80
While pressure to wear the veil and subsequent physical
attacks on dissenting women are very real problems, they are in
large part born out of the poverty and racism French Muslims
face.81 These factors also tend to be the very things that compel
many schoolgirls to wear the headscarf8 2 In fact, one member of
the Stasi Commission, Hanifa Cherifi, found that most of the
"headscarf militant" girls she knew wore hijab against their
parents' wishes rather than because of family pressure. 3 As one
young woman said, "[My parents] told me the most important
thing was that I integrate into French society, but I stuck my
ground, because the veil symbolises my relationship with God."8 4
Other girls wear it with a sense of rebellion: according to one
teacher, they combine a traditional hijab with "sexy clothes,
figure hugging trousers and the like. For these girls wearing the
head scarf is a fashion and a way of asserting their Arab
identity." 5 Such displays may appear to undermine the true
78 Tore Lindholm, The Strasbourg Court Dealing with Turkey and the Human
Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Critical Assessment in the Light of Recent
Case Law 3 (unpublished seminar paper), available at http://www.strasbourg
conference.org/papers.php. This Article even goes so far as to suggest that Sahin was
decided in favor of secular principles because the ECHR is situated in Strasbourg,
France. See id.
11 Baker, supra note 30, at 341 n.7.
80 See Skach, supra note 69, at 191 n.12.
81 See Gey, supra note 75, at 14-15.
82 See id. at 15.
83 Nusrat Choudhury, From the Stasi Commission to the European Court of
Human Rights: L'Affaire du Foulard and the Challenge of Protecting the Rights of
Muslim Girls, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 199, 224 (2007). Note that Cherifi supports
the French ban. See id.
4 Hannah Godfrey, Schools' Bid for Headscarf Ban Widens French Divide:
Crackdown Exposes the Fissures Between State and Religion, Reports Hannah
Godfrey, THE OBSERVER, June 15, 2003, at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting French school teacher Sophie Eliard) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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purpose of hijab-modesty. It is not the province of the secular
state, however, to interpret the tenets of Islam. The state's only
concern would be whether the adherent has a sincerely held
religious belief. Thus, in France, the headscarf can be seen as
more than a religious symbol or a tool of oppression. It can also
be a representation of "ethno-cultural identity"-in this respect,
it is worn in solidarity and in protest against the racism,
exclusion, and anti-Islam sentiment that some feel is rampant in
France. 6 In fact, the number of headscarves in French schools
increased during the Iraq war. Combating poverty and
ghettoization of Muslims by integrating them into French society
in a culturally respectful way would be more conducive to
protecting women than a blanket ban on conspicuous religious
symbols. The ban has not slowed the escalating racial tension in
France and forcing Muslim students out of school only further
excludes them from education and employment options. At best,
the ban forces them into private Muslim schools where they will
continue to be isolated from French culture. This will only
prolong the violence and poverty facing Muslims in the French
ghettos.
II. THE BAN IN TURKEY
A. History
Turkey has no state religion, but since Muslims are in the
majority in Turkey, 8 one would think that it would be a safe
haven for women and girls wishing to wear a headscarf. Instead,
Turkey's restrictions on the headscarves are among the most
stringent in Europe. We should examine very carefully the
rationale for Turkey's hijab ban before dismissing it as
disproportional to perceived threats. Turkey is unlikely to have
the same animus against Muslims that France is accused of
having. In Turkey, Muslim women wearing headscarves are not
"others." They are perhaps the wives, mothers, and daughters of
the legislators-although not the legislators themselves, because
any elected females cannot wear the headscarf in government
86 See Choudhury, supra note 83, at 248-49.
87 Godfrey, supra note 84.
s Ninety nine percent-or 68 million out of 68.7 million Turkish inhabitants-
are Muslim. Muslims in Europe: Country Guide, BBC NEWS, Dec. 23, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm (citing 2003 census figures).
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buildings.8 9 It is difficult to estimate the number of women
disenfranchised and deterred from education and employment
opportunities in Turkey because women have not been able to
take the Civil Service Appointments Examination and University
Entrance Examination in headscarves since 2000 and 2002,
respectively. Nevertheless, a December 2008 AK-DER study
estimates that over ten thousand civil servants and one hundred
thousand students have been forced out of their institutions. 90
According to a survey in the same study, 20.8% of Turkish
women said the headscarf kept them from being employed, 17.8%
were forced to work in jobs where they would have no contact
with the public, and 17.1% ended up working in a job outside
their regular profession because of the headscarf.91  The
headscarf is banned in schools of all levels, including private
schools, which are subject to the same laws.92
Modernism has been a guiding force behind Turkish values
since the country's founding in the 1920s. The founder of the
Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was a reformer "for
whom 'modern' meant 'Western'.. . [and who] spent a lot of time
trying to get women to uncover."93 Ataturk banned males from
wearing a fez, urging them to wear a Western-style brimstone
hat instead, and brought along his "uncovered" wife and
assistants as he gave lectures asking Turkish women to become
modern.94 He then suggested a ban on hijab for civil service
employees in government buildings as well as students in all
schools, including universities.95 Today, modernism continues to
be an important value in Turkish society.96 Turkey is staunch in
proving itself, at least in perception, as a secular democracy not
89 See the example of Merve Kavakci, supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
90 AK-DER, A STATISTICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CONDITION OF WOMEN IN
TURKEY AND THE IMPACT OF THE HEADSCARF BAN ON TURKEY'S GENDER EQUALITY
RANKING, at pt. 111.1 (2008), available at http://www.ak-der.org/?p=reports&view=
detail&tbl=rpt&cid= 100&cnnm=35&lang=eng&m=a8445719836f2d5e8b51986410e1
4728 [hereinafter AK-DER, Turkey's Gender Equality Ranking]. AK-DER is a non-
governmental organization in Special Consultative Status with the Economic and
Social Council of the U.N.
91 Id.
92 See id. at Part II.1.
93 Delaney, supra note 17, at 159.
94 Id.
9" See id.
9 See Q&A: Turkey's EU Entry Talks, BBC NEWS, Dec. 11, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4107919.stm.
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to be confused with other Muslim majority countries or Sharia
states.97 One major reason for this mindset may be that Turkey
is eager to join the European Union ("EU").9 One step to
assimilating itself into European legal culture was signing on to
the European Convention of Human Rights ("European
Convention"), which makes it subject to the decisions of the
ECHR.99
Some argue that Turkish laik, Turkey's version of secularism
or la~cit, was imposed not by a democratic process, but by
military coups, and is not really what the people want.'00 The
headscarf ban itself has its origins in a 1980 coup d'tat that saw
a military junta come to power, institute the headscarf laws in
1981, and continually block the attempts of democratically
elected governments to reverse the ban.' In 1985, the
Disciplinary Regulation for Students in Higher Education was
amended to add a punishment for students who appeared in a
headscarf. Then, in 1987, a law granting amnesty to those
students was vetoed by the President. 10 2 The government later
passed an amendment to the Law on Higher Education that
would allow students to cover the neck and hair for religious
reasons, but it was annulled by the Constitutional Court in 1989
on the ground that it was a breach of the principle of secularism
that threatened the unity of the state, security, and public
order. 103
97 See Opinion, Turkey's Democracy, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 3, 2007,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/03/opinion/edturk.php.
98 See Q&A: Turkey's EU Entry Talks, supra note 96 (noting Turkey's forty-year
courtship of the European Union).
See id. (noting that progress on human rights was a provision for Turkey to be
considered for EU membership).
100 See Lindholm, supra note 78, at 12.
101 T. Jeremy Gunn, Fearful Symbols: The Islamic Headscarf and the European
Court of Human Rights (July 4, 2005), available at http://www.strasbourg
conference.org/papers.php. [hereinafter Gunn, Fearful Symbols].
'02 Human Rights Watch, Memorandum from Human Rights Watch to the
Turkish Government on Human Rights Watch's Concerns withRegard to Academic
Freedom in Higher Education, and Access to Higher Education for Women who
Wear the Headscarf 27 (June 29, 2004), http://wwwhrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/
ecalturkey/2004lheadscarf memo.pdf [hereinafterMemorandum].
103 See id.
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The power struggle over the headscarf continues today. In
2008, the AK Party used its power to enact Law No. 5735, a
parliamentary amendment overturning the ban in universities." 4
The amendment was officially approved by President Abdullah
Gil on February 22, 2008.05 By June, the Constitutional Court
of Turkey struck down the amendment as a violation of the
Constitution's Article 2 secular principles, despite a finding by
the court's rapporteur that the case should have been dismissed
on a procedural basis.10 6 Part of the Turkish court's rationale
was that lifting the ban could lead to "social conflicts between
Muslims who cover their heads and those who do not by using
the headscarf as a political symbol" because "[i]t is impossible to
preserve social order once religions begin to dominate the
political structure!! and start forming the basis of the legitimacy
of legal norms."0 7 The court, however, did not cite any examples
of such conflicts in preceding months. It inaccurately relied on
the ECHR's decision in Sahin, which stands for the proposition
that Turkey's headscarf ban is not an infringement of religious
beliefs-however, this only indicates that the ban is permissible,
not mandatory.1 08  Commentators have disagreed with the
Constitutional Court, asserting that "[dleclaring that this
amendment is contrary to the Constitution conflicts with the
principle of equality."1 0 9
The court did not stop at ruling on the headscarf ban. It also
criticized the AK Party in the decision, stating that "[tihe
proposal and passage of the law, which changed the Constitution
in order to allow the wearing of the headscarf in universities,
'o4 See Adnan Kuifik, Op-Ed., With Court's Ruling Religious Freedoms
Can Be Restricted, but Not Expanded, TODAY'S ZAMAN, Nov. 2, 2008, http:/!
www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link= 157575&bolum= 109.
'05 See Turkey: Constitutional Court Ruling Upholds Headscarf Ban, HUM. RITS
WATCH, June 5, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/06/05/turkey-constitutional-
court-ruling-upholds-headscarf-ban.
"o See id.
107 Muscling in on Parliament's Turf, HUJRRIYET, Oct. 23, 2008, available at
http'/arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-639341 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
"' See Ergun Ozbudun, Op-Ed., Reasoning for Headscarf Decision: New
Constitution Is Now a Must, TODAY'S ZAMAN, Oct. 26, 2008, http://www.todays
zaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=156932. The court also invoked the
ECHR's decision in Dahlab, which is distinguishable on the basis that Dahlab
involved a schoolteacher, that is, a representative of the state itself, rather than a
university student. Id.
109 Kiiqik, supra note 104.
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means that the party adopted and has become a focal point of
anti-secular activities," and "[i]t is undeniable that the actions of
the party, which is considered anti-secular because of its abuse of
religion and religious feelings, hinder democracy and have raised
questions about the legitimacy of the constitutional order by
alienating the society from the state and politics."11 In fact, after
the ban was reinstated, up to seventy-one AK members,
including Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President
Gil, faced bans for belonging to the party. 1 ' In July 2008, the
AK Party survived by a single vote of the Constitutional Court,
receiving six out of the necessary seven votes to ban it. 1 2 The
party nevertheless faced steep penalties, as the court slashed
half its treasury funding for 2008 and issued a "serious warning"
to the party for steering the country in too religious a direction.1 1 3
Given that even Turkey's government has often considered
the problems inherent in the headscarf ban, such a wide margin
of appreciation should not have been granted by the Sahin
court." 4 Instituting a ban on headscarves by a military junta
and nearly dismantling a democratically elected political party
just for attempting to undo the ban are just the types of
government action that the ECHR is supposed to penalize to
keep human rights intact and keep governments accountable. If
Turkey did not want this type of scrutiny, it should not have
signed on to the European Convention. The ECHR did Turkey a
disservice by bending over backwards to justify the country's law.
The rationale of "secularism" is highly suspect when the
government has a Department of Religious Affairs that takes a
heavy-handed approach towards Islam. Among the department's
duties are writing sermons, appointing clergy, and controlling
the building of mosques." 5 In 2001, the United Nations ("U.N.")
110 'AKP Abused Religious Beliefs,' Top Court Says, HURRIYET, Oct. 25, 2008,
available at http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-639521 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
"I Sabrina Tavernise, Bid To Allow Head Scarves in Top Turkish Court, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 6, 2008, at A6. ("The head-scarf amendment is considered to be the
single most important irritant that set off the case to ban Mr. Erdogan and seventy
other AKP members, and it is central to the prosecution's argument that he and his
allies are trying to dismantle secularism in Turkey. .).
112 Sabrina Tavernise & Sebnem Arsu, Court Declares Turkey's Ruling Party
Constitutional but Limits Its Financing, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2008, at A6.
113 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
14 See Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 197-98 para. 81.
11 Gunn, Fearful Symbols, supra note 101, at 17-18.
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Special Rapporteur questioned whether Turkey was truly
secular, noting the power of the Department, and saying that the
headscarf ban was not proportional to "legitimate concerns over
the political exploitation of religion."11 6  Due to the same
concerns, the Turkish government mandates that Sunni Islam be
taught in all the schools-this began after the same 1980
military coup that resulted in the hijab ban."7
B. Sahin
There was some debate in the ECHR opinion in Sahin over
whether the scarf was actually banned by law.18 In fact, there is
no official law "banning" headscarves, but rather the provisions
in question come from the dress code for federal employees and
university students." 9  Often, someone new will take over a
university and change or begin enforcing the dress code, which is
how students like Sahin can be undisturbed for months or years
and one day, suddenly be asked to take the headscarf off. 2° This
creates a lot of uncertainty for young women studying in Turkey,
some of whom have had trouble completing a degree. 12 1
Sahin, age twenty-four, had worn her headscarf during the
first four years of her education at the University of Bursa, but
upon her enrollment at the University of Istanbul's medical
school, the vice-chancellor issued a declaration stating that
students with head-coverings or beards-common to the Sikh
116 Memorandum, supra note 102, at 32 (quoting The Secretary-General, Interim
Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, para. 131, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/55/280/Add. 1, at 3
(Aug. 11, 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117 Gunn, Fearful Symbols, supra note 101, at 17.
118 See Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 197-98.
'19 Merve Kavakci, Turkey's Fashion Police, 145 FOREIGN POL'Y 16, 16 (2004).
120 See Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 181.
121 Note that Sahin was not the first time the European Court ruled in favor of
Turkey on a hijab question. In 1993, the European Commission of Human Rights,
the predecessor to the current ECHR, held inadmissible a petition by a Turkish
public university student who was denied a diploma because she wore the hijab in
her identification picture, reasoning that the hijab hindered proper identification.
See generally Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec.
& Rep. 93 (1993). Although some sort of compromise would have been preferable,
this decision is not as objectionable as Sahin and can be compared to a Florida case
where a Muslim woman was not allowed to take a driver's license photo in a scarf
which covered her face, and the court held that the requirement to remove the scarf
did not substantially burden her. See Freeman v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor
Vehicles, 924 So.2d 48, 56-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
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religion-must no longer be allowed to attend courses. 122  She
was denied entrance to exams, issued warnings, and ultimately
suspended after taking part in demonstrations. 23  Turkey
strengthened its dress code policy by issuing section 13(b) of
Law No. 2547, the Higher Education Act, giving university
chancellors the "power to regulate students' dress for the
purposes of maintaining order."124  Amnesty was granted to
Sahin and similarly situated students by Law No. 4584 in June
2000.125
Although the Court held that limiting the right to wear the
hijab via the dress code interfered with Sahin's right to manifest
her religious beliefs under Article 9(1) of the European
Convention, 126 it ultimately found that the interference was
justified under the three-prong "legitimate state interest" test of
Article 9(2). Here, the interference was justified because the
restriction was held to be prescribed by law; 127 it was in the
pursuit of legitimate aims-in this case, protection of the rights
and freedoms of others and protection of public order 12 -and it
was necessary in a democratic society.
129
122 Skach, supra note 69, at 186-87.
123 Sahin, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 182.
124 Id. at 182.
121 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 299, para. 24 (June 29,
2004) (Chamber Judgment).
126 Id. para. 71. article 9 of the Convention provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom,
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
127 See Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, at paras. 72-81. The fact that the headscarf
ban came into play by military coup was glossed over by the Court, who simply said
that the ban had "existed for a number of years." Id. para. 112; see also Gunn,
Fearful Symbols, supra note 101, at 6-14 (re-writing this section of the ECHR Sahin
decision and adding in facts about the ban's history that were omitted by the court).
128 See Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, at paras. 82-84 (June 29, 2004).
129 See id. paras. 97-115.
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"Necessity" implies proportionality, as limitations on
religious freedom should be invoked only to the extent that they
preserve order.130 The ECHR accepted Turkey's contention that
it was necessary in the interests of secularism and gender
equality to ban the hijab, but the Court did not point to a single
other country in the world that considered it necessary to ban the
headscarf in universities.
131
1. Gender Equality
The Court's agreement with Turkey's gender equality
rationalization for the ban is dubious given that a large number
of women will be excluded from education and government jobs
due to their choice to wear the hijab. 32 While the policy applies
to both sexes because it does not allow men to grow beards or
wear a turban, it mostly impacts women. Since the hijab is seen
by some as a powerful religious symbol, the court analyzed the
impact it may have on those who choose not to wear it. 133 The
court did not go into much detail here, showing great deference to
Turkey's arguments and finding it sufficient to note that "[we]
do[] not lose sight of the fact that there are extremist political
movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a whole
their religious symbols and conception of a society founded on
religious precepts."34 Critics of the ECHR say that the headscarf
issue is merely a pretext that symbolizes the real concern: that
extremists will take over the country and Turkey, like its
130 See id. para. 103.
131 See Gunn, Fearful Symbols, supra note 101, at 26. A university headscarf
ban in Uzbekistan, which, like Turkey, is a predominantly Muslim nation,
was struck down by the U.N. Human Rights Committee (the "Committee"). See
U.N. Human Rights Comm, Communication No. 931/2000: Uzbekistan, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000, para. 3 (Jan. 18, 2005) (submitted by Raihon
Hudoyberganova) [hereinafter Hudoyberganova]. Unlike the ECHR in Sahin, the
Committee held that Uzbekistan had violated the rights of Raihon Hudoyberganova
under article 18(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), which is virtually identical to article 9 of the European Convention.
Hudoyberganova was a university student at the Tashkent State Institute when she
was denied access to courses and other university privileges after refusing to remove
her hijab. The Committee deemed that this action was a violation of the ICCPR right
to have or adopt a religion and that Uzbekistan had not made a showing that this
policy was necessary. See id. para. 6.2.
132 See infra text accompanying notes 147-153.
133 See Sahin, App. No. 44774/98, at para. 108.
134 Id. para. 109.
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neighbor Iran, will impose Islamic values on all citizens.13
Perhaps this is a valid fear, but a spokeswoman for the Women
for Women's Human Rights organization thinks that the ban is
counterproductive, as it will only strengthen the position of
hardcore Islamic politicians. 13  This has proven true as Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, who was elected Prime Minister in 2003, is
known for his religious observance and promise to end the hijab
ban. His party was re-elected by a large margin in July 2008
and did, in fact, attempt to overturn the ban, at least in
universities-a decision that put him into political hot water
with the courts. 137
Most times, hijab is not really a threat to public order until
someone steps in to stop people from wearing it138 -one need only
look to the riots that occurred in France or the controversy
following the foulard affair.'39  The Human Rights Watch
criticized Turkey for using government power to "force the
educational system to reflect the values of state power holders
and serve their interests" in contravention of Article 26(1) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 13 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights."4 ° When it comes to public order, it seems that the ban
itself is causing most of the disturbances.' The Human Rights
Watch reports that some officials have stopped women in hijab
135 See Lindholm, supra note 78, at 16.
136 See Gunn, Fearful Symbols, supra note 101, at 26.
137 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
138 See Memorandum, supra note 102, at 24 ("Headscarves do not pose a threat
to public safety, health, order, or morals, and they do not impinge on the rights of
others .... [They] are not inherently dangerous or disruptive of order, and do not
undermine educational functions."). The report notes that many Turkish teachers
have been suspended or fired for wearing hijab. See id. at 28.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
0 See Memorandum, supra note 102, at 7-8.
141 Turkey's human rights abuses against education include:
a ban on campuses of any independent organizations that are considered
political; refusal of permission to hold a seminar on human rights; state-
supported harassment of independent libraries that were established to
provide access to materials to which there is no access in state institutions;
charges of having published a play that was considered blasphemous; [and]
charges against and conviction of the head of a political science
department, who was also a contributor to a student magazine, for having
defamed the religion of the state.
Id. at 9 (quoting U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 37,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/63 (Jan. 18, 2000) (prepared by Abid Hussain)).
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from enrolling in driving classes, that vocal support of a woman's
right to wear hijab is grounds for persecution, that academics
who have tried to prevent their schools from banning hijab in the
dress code have been fired, and that lawyers and human rights
campaigners attempting to help women fight for the right to
wear hijab have been mistreated by police and prosecuted. 14 2
Female students who wear headscarves have not only been
prevented from entering classrooms and taking exams, but also
report being detained, prosecuted, and humiliated. 4 3 Having to
take the headscarf off in front of men who are not related to them
is a major violation of their beliefs.'" It is Turkey's actions that
have caused more public disorder with regard to the ban than the
"pressure" on women to which the Court alludes.1 45 More than
ninety-seven percent of covered Turkish women surveyed in 2008
said that they wore the headscarf to comply with religious
beliefs, with less than one percent stating that they wore it to
adhere to political views or because their husbands, fianc6s, or
family members asked them to do so. 1 46
The irony is that the government pressure on women not to
wear the headscarf if they ever hope to be a doctor, lawyer, or
other professional, and the harm caused by this pressure, has
been concrete. A 2008 study by AK-DER revealed that Turkey
ranked 105th out of 115 countries surveyed for women's rights.
This placed Turkey behind all EU states and even some Islamic
countries in terms of economic opportunity, education, health,
and political power. 147
Women in Turkey know that they may not be able to
complete their degrees if they choose to wear hijab and that even
if they do, their employment options will be severely limited.
Women in headscarves have not been permitted to take the
Turkish civil service examination since 2000, and there have
even been reports of government workers being punished for
wearing a headscarf after hours.14  AK-DER estimates that
15,000 female civil servants were dismissed and or forced to
142 See AK-DER, Turkey's Gender Equality Ranking, supra note 90, pt. V.3.
143 See id. pt. I.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.
145 See Sahin v. Turkey, App. No 44777/98 Eur. Ct. H.R. 299, para. 99 (June 29,
2005) (Chamber Judgement).
146 See AK-DER, Turkey's Gender Equality Ranking, supra note 90, pt. V.3.
147 See id. pt. I.
148 See id. pt II.2(b).
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resign for wearing headscarves between 1998 and 2002.'14 The
private sector has also been impacted by the headscarf ban.
Female lawyers may not wear headscarves in court, forcing them
to send proxies in their stead.' 50 The Istanbul Bar Association
does not allow headscarves, 15 1 and the Ankara Bar Association
actually disciplined seventeen female attorneys who wore
headscarves while voting in Bar Association elections. 152 These
attitudes deprive women of the ability to practice their craft to
the fullest extent and enjoy the same opportunities for
networking and professional advancement as men. Furthermore,
many private firms and organizations hesitate to hire women in
hijab due to fears of being seen as fundamentalist and losing
business. 153
That the university headscarf ban was undone and then re-
instated in a matter of months in 2008 further underscores that
Turkey is a volatile area for religiously observant women
pursuing their livelihoods. Since men own ninety-two percent of
property in Turkey and account for eighty-four percent of the
gross national product, 154 women in headscarves are forced to
rely on their husbands or fathers for social security and
healthcare benefits.'55 These conditions reveal a far more serious
and imminent harm to Turkish women than the ECHR's vague
speculation that "pressure" to wear the hijab could someday lead
to implementation of Sharia law or some other unnamed threat
to the public order. As the dissent of Belgian Judge Franqoise
Tulkens points out, there is no harm proven in the Sahin
majority opinion, which relies on "mere worries or fears."56 The
majority focuses on the possible pressures involved in wearing
hijab while minimizing the pressure the government puts on
religious women who simply wish to follow what they believe is a
149 See id.
150 See id.
"' See id.
152 Jenny White, Guilty Although Proven Innocent, KAMIL PASHA, Dec. 13, 2008,
http://www.kamilpasha.com/2008/12/13/guilty-although-proven-innocent.
See AK-DER, Turkey's Gender Equality Ranking, supra note 90, pt. II.2(b).
' See id. pt. 11.5(a).
155 See id. pt. 11.6(b).
156 Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 222 para. 5 (Tulkens, J.,
dissenting) ("Only indisputable facts and reasons whose legitimacy is beyond
doubt... are capable of satisfying that requirement and justifying interference with
a right guaranteed by the Convention.").
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prescribed modesty code. If any signatory to the European
Convention had a law stating that women could not attend school
unless they wore the headscarf, one would expect the ECHR to
promptly shoot it down-just as it should have shot down
Turkey's analogous ban on the scarf. If a woman can meet
university admissions criteria, pass a civil service exam, or be
elected to political office, she should be trusted to interpret
scripture and make a choice as to her cultural values about
covering her head.
When a woman has strong beliefs that her religion requires
her to wear hijab, her choices are limited: she can continue her
studies sans headscarf in violation of her conscience, she can
discontinue her education, or she can go somewhere that allows
her to follow both her religion and her aspirations. Women like
Sahin often wind up leaving the country to complete their
studies. This may be a proper solution for women with the
money and resources to do so, but it is not possible for many
poorer rural women who, arguably, could benefit from education
the most. Ultimately, many Turkish women who are religious
and want to wear the headscarf may feel forced to complete their
studies in a foreign country. These women may never return
because the ban will interfere with their chances of employment,
even after they obtain a degree. In this way, Turkey may have
deprived itself of a whole generation of professional women and
role models. This is a far greater threat to gender equality than
the hijab. Educated, professional women who choose to wear
hijab show that the hijab does not have to symbolize
oppression. 15 7 By forcing women to choose between education
and hijab, a government ensures that the women in hijab will be
less able to have careers, thus perpetuating the stereotype that
those who wear hijab are the uneducated country-dwellers while
the intellectual elite go uncovered. This reinforces the teachings
of Ataturk.
157 See Sabrina Tavernise, In Turkey, a Step To Allow Head Scarves, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2008, at A3 (noting one woman's belief that she is proof that Ataturk's
theory has failed because she is an enlightened woman, engaging in graduate level
sociology work, who also wears a head scarf).
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2. Secularism
The ECHR first heralded secularism as valuable to
democratic society in the 2001 case of Refah Partisi v. Turkey,158
calling it "conducive to religious harmony and tolerance." 159 The
court in Sahin noted that in Turkey, "the majority of the
population, while professing a strong attachment to the rights of
women and a secular way of life, adhere to the Islamic faith" and
thus, reasoned that "[ilmposing limitations on freedom in this
sphere may, therefore, be regarded as meeting a pressing social
need by seeking to achieve those two legitimate aims, especially
since ... this religious symbol has taken on political significance
in Turkey in recent years."1 6 0  The court heeded Turkey's
concerns about extremist political movements that may "seek to
impose on society as a whole their religious symbols and
conception of a society founded on religious precepts" and
respected Turkey's attempt to take a stance against such
movements, given the nation's past experiences. 16 1
For some, the justification behind the headscarf ban is that
secularism promotes public order by allowing students to study
free of the political ramifications that the scarf symbolizes.162
Particularly, the sight of hijab evokes images of political Islam
taking over Turkey and suppressing human rights, especially
women's human rights. 163 In effect, this view represents fears
that Turkey will become a country like Afghanistan under the
Taliban. People who think this way have trouble seeing
headscarves as simply manifestations of individual religious
freedom by women. The dissent in Sahin found these views
meritless-there was no evidence that Leyla Sahin was in any
way connected to fundamentalism or that her wearing a
headscarf caused any actual incidences of disruption to public
158 App. No 41340/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2001), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
echr/ (follow "Case-Law" hyperlink; then follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; then
select "HUDOC Collection" check-block at upper-left corner; then enter "41340/98" in
the "Application Number" field; then select "Search" option).
159 Id. para. 51.
160 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 447774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 108 (June 29, 2004)
(Chamber Judgment).
161 Id. para. 109. The same logic explains why, for example, Germany can take a
tougher stance against the expression of Nazi beliefs, given its history with the
Holocaust.
162 Id. para. 36; see also Gunn, supra note 1, at 455.
16 See Gunn, supra note 1, at 456-57.
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order.164 Although it is possible that certain types of hijab could
cause disruption in the classroom,165 Turkey did not produce any
evidence on that point. Rather, the Sahin majority borrowed
language from Dahlab v. Switzerland about hijab being a
"powerful external symbol" while ignoring how gender equality
may call for respecting the rights of women. 166  The court, in
comparing the law of Turkey to hijab laws in several other
countries, never mentioned that Turkey's law was the only one to
ban university students of legal age from wearing hijab, cutting
into the "margin of appreciation" argument.1 67 Indeed, the court
glossed over deciding whether Turkey's ban on the hijab, even in
universities, was constitutional under Turkey's own legal scheme
and simply assumed it to be part of a "democratic" decision-
making process that was necessary.1 68  Had they looked at
Turkey's own decisions, the court would have found some
troubling examples-in several cases, judges who found for the
plaintiffs in hijab cases were immediately transferred to courts
much further away, which hardly sounds "democratic."69 Even
students who have won in court have found that the decision did
164 See Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, 224-25 para. 10 (Tulkens, J.,
dissenting) ("Merely wearing the headscarf cannot be associated with
fundamentalism and it is vital to distinguish between those who wear the headscarf
and 'extremists' who seek to impose the headscarf as they do other religious
symbols.").
165 Human Rights Committee Member Ruth Wedgwood chose to write separate
from the majority in the Hudoyberganova case due to her belief that the headscarf
would legitimately interfere with a woman's university studies in some instances. In
that case, there had been no facts indicating exactly what type of headscarf
Hudoyberganova wore. Wedgwood noted that hijab covering her whole face would be
problematic if a professor wished to establish eye contact with her or determine
whether she was focused on the lecture. See Hudoyberganova, supra note 131, at
paras. 2-4 (individual opinion of Ruth Wedgwood). Wedgwood gives a good example
of an appropriate, narrowly tailored measure of whether the human right to wear
the headscarf may be infringed in the school context.
166 Sahin v. Turkey, App. No 44777/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 98 (June 29, 2004)
(Chamber Judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Skach, supra note
69, at 192.
167 See supra text accompanying note 35.
16 See Gunn, Fearful Symbols, supra note 101, at 5.
169 See Memorandum, supra note 102, at 29 (discussing examples of punitive
transfers for judges who found the headscarf bans to violate the "constitutional right
to education").
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not have any practical effect, as the school still did not allow
them to complete their degrees. 170
Critics say that Sahin demonstrates "how failing to analyze
the issues objectively and openly can result in the suppression of
human rights by an institution that was created to protect
them."17' According to a 2004 survey, seventy-one percent of
Turkish citizens believe hijab should be an option for university
students and sixty-four percent think female government officials
should be allowed to wear headscarves in office. 172 Nevertheless,
with the recent attempt to lift the ban in universities having
been overturned by the courts and the subsequent political
trouble for the party who supported the change, the prognosis for
any advancement is bleak.
IV. HIJAB IN UNITED STATES SCHOOLS
A. The Problem
The United States Constitution protects the right to free
exercise of religion. 173 There can be no federal ban on religious
dress in this country. 74 Laws that specifically target religious
practice are subject to strict scrutiny by courts, which means that
the state must show a compelling interest for the law and prove
that the law is narrowly tailored to protecting that interest. 175
This is comparable to the ECHR test, in which the government
must prove that a limitation of religious freedom is proportional
to a legitimate government aim. 1 6 The ECHR determined that
170 See id. at 29-30 (discussing Fatma G6kqen's expulsion from her place in the
physics department of the Istanbul University science faculty for wearing the
headscarf and participating in a protest). The Turkish Administrative Court said
this interfered with Gokqen's constitutional right to public protest, but the school
still refused to let her in, rendering her unable to complete her degree and find a job.
Like Sahin, she left Turkey--Gbkqen continued her studies in the United States. See
id.
171 Gunn, Fearful Symbols, supra note 101, at 1.
172 See Kavakci, Headscarf Heresy, supra note 21, at 66.
173 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
174 See Custos, supra note 28, at 340 (outlining arguments that a historical
commitment to freedom of religion and expression would lead to a judicial rejection
of an attempt to pass an American counterpart to the French ban).
175 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
176 See, e.g., Sahin v.Turkey, App. No 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 103 (June
29, 2004) (Chamber Judgment).
20091 DRAWING A VEIL ON FREE EXPRESSION OF FAITH 333
Turkey had a compelling interest to ban headscarves in Sahin."'7
The U.S. Supreme Court would conclude otherwise because the
U.S. does not have the same concerns of Islamic fundamentalism
or pressure on girls to wear the headscarf. Although the U.S.
recognizes separation of church and state under the
Establishment Clause, we do not have the same staunch concept
of secularism-laecitg, or laik-as France and Turkey,
diminishing the likelihood of finding a compelling interest on
that basis. 178
Even in light of the protections provided by the Constitution,
U.S. law is not always as protective of the right of students to
wear religious dress as one would think. For example, a
generally applicable and neutral law or policy in a school against
all hats or caps could pass constitutional muster even though it
would impinge on the First Amendment right to exercise one's
religious belief by wearing a headscarf or turban. 79 Until the
1990 decision of Employment Division v. Smith,8 ° all laws
conflicting with religious freedom had to undergo a strict
scrutiny analysis;"' if the law was not narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest, the state had to grant a
religious exemption to believers. Smith changed the law by
establishing that the government need not prove a compelling
interest if the law was deemed neutral. As long as the burden on
religious believers is only incidental and religion is not
specifically targeted, the law is constitutional, and no religious
exemption need be made." 2 This was a huge shift in the
landscape of religious jurisprudence in the U.S. since it is
difficult for plaintiffs to show that a law specifically targets
religion.8 3 Even when they do, they will not win until they
demonstrate that the law fails strict scrutiny.
... Id. para. 84.
178 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
179 See infra text accompanying note 190.
180 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
181 Id. at 885.
182 See id. at 879.
3 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 533-34 (1993).
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In response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"),"' which mandated that
potential violations of religious freedom would fall under strict
scrutiny.1 85 Part of the RFRA, however, was overturned in 1997
because it overstepped Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment against states.18 6  In Gonzales v. 0
Centro Espirita Beneficente Unido do Vegetal, 8 7 the Court held
that the federal government must show a compelling state
interest in restricting religious freedom, affirming that the RFRA
applies when examining a federal law.18 8  Thirteen states now
have their own versions of the RFRA to provide protection where
the federal government does not, and appellate courts in at least
another twelve have interpreted their state constitutions under
the Sherbert compelling interest test instead of the test from
Smith.8 9
For the hijab debate, this means that any attempt by the
federal government to ban hijab would be subject to strict
scrutiny and the ban would probably be struck down.' 90 This is
not particularly relevant in the school context because education
is generally within the realm of state law. Since the federal
RFRA does not apply to states, a state could ban hijab in schools
if the ban were part of an otherwise neutral law,1 91 unless
some state-enacted RFRA prevented doing so. Less than half
of the states, however, actually have their own RFRAs. 92 After
184 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006).
1 5 Id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
186 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
187 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
188 See id. at 424. This case is distinguishable from Smith, in which the Court
found that Oregon was not constitutionally mandated to grant an exemption from a
state anti-drug law to Native Americans who used peyote in a religious ceremony,
since the law was generally applicable to all. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. Gonzales
dealt with a federal law, the Controlled Substances Act, and there, the Court held
that strict scrutiny must be applied in deciding whether to grant an exemption
regardless of general applicability-in effect confirming the RFRA's mandate to
analyze under the Sherbert test. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 424-25, 439.
189 See Douglas Laycock, Church and State in the United States: Competing
Conceptions and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 503, 537 (2006).
190 See supra note 4.
191 The French law, although neutral insofar as it does not single out the garb of
one religion, specifically targets religion as opposed to non-religion. Thus, any
American counterpart would not pass the Smith test and would need to be analyzed
under strict scrutiny. See Laycock, supra note 189, at 538-39.
192 See supra text accompany note 189.
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the part of the RFRA that applied to states was ruled
unconstitutional, the U.S. Department of Education revised its
guidelines for schools: "Students generally have no federal right
to be exempted from religiously neutral and generally applicable
school dress rules based on their religious beliefs or practices."193
This leaves it up to individual states and schools to provide as
much protection as they like but makes it clear that the
burdensome Smith rule applies if there is a challenge by a
student, unless the student could show some evidence that the
policy is not neutral towards religion-for example, by
demonstrating that the school allows exceptions from the policy
in non-religious contexts but not for religious adherents.194
Perhaps Justice Scalia, who authored the decision in Smith,
would agree that it is the responsibility of citizens to bring their
disagreements with the law to the states by asking their local
governments or school boards for assistance. The original RFRA
was a response to Smith, and when it was struck down because
Congress did not have the Fourteenth Amendment power to pass
it, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA") 95 pursuant to its commerce and
spending powers. The RLUIPA subsequently restored the strict
scrutiny test in some areas of the law. This demonstrates the
historic tradition of respect the American government and its
people have had for religious freedom, in contrast to lacit's near
hostility to religion. Still, Smith presents a sort of loophole in
American law that deserves to be looked at in a comparative law
context. While no law can be passed to explicitly prevent the
wearing of hijab, we do not necessarily provide enough federal
19, Charles C. Haynes, Dress Codes vs. Religious Practice: What Kind of Nation
Are We?, FIRsTAMENDMENTCENTER.ORG (Oct. 19, 2003), http://www.firstamendment
center.org/commentary.aspx?id=12080 (quoting U.S. Dep't. of Educ., Religious Expr-
ession in Public Schools (May 1998), http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/08-1995/religion.
html) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194 See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170
F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying strict scrutiny to a New Jersey police
department policy requiring all men to shave their beards because it was not neutral
and generally applicable, as the department granted medical exemptions to some
officers but refused to do the same for Muslim officers who sincerely believed that
wearing a beard was a requirement of their religion).
195 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2006) (protecting religious
institutions and prisoners from laws that burden their free exercise rights).
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protection when people who wear headscarves are incidentally
burdened. Other Western countries, such as Canada 196 and
Great Britain,'97 provide explicit protection to students.
In its failure to provide such federal protection, the
American system leaves it to the states to do so, or alternatively,
to the school districts to come up with a compromise 98 or change
their dress codes.' 99 In the end, most of these problems are
worked out in a rational manner but not without causing
significant strife and pain to the young people who are affected.
An eleven-year-old Muslim girl was suspended from an
Oklahoma public school for wearing hijab under a policy intended
to reduce gang-related activity.20  After wearing the hijab
without incident for several weeks upon commencement of the
school year, Nashala Hearn was asked by school officials on
196 According to the Quebec Human Rights Committee, "one should presume
that hijab-wearers are expressing their religious convictions and the hijab should
only be banned when it is demonstrated-and not just presumed-that public order
or sexual equality is in danger." Baines, supra note 30, at 324 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
197 The leading British case on the subject is R v. Denbigh High School, [2006]
UKHL 15, [1]-[99] (Eng.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd06O322/begum.pdf. The school uniform at Denbigh allowed
female students to wear a certain type of Muslim dress called shalwar kameeze, but
thirteen-year-old Shabina Begum insisted on wearing the more modest jilbab. See id.
at [61, [10]. The prior Court of Appeals decision in this case took Sahin into
consideration, but distinguished it on the ground that unlike Turkey, England is not
a secular state. See id. at [60]-[611. It is ironic that an officially Anglican state would
use such reasoning to protect the rights of Muslims to a greater extent than Turkish
law does. The Court of Appeals held that the school had a duty to provide Begum
with an education, which would not be possible for her had she been unable to wear
certain garments. See id. at [27].
191 See, e.g., Haynes, supra note 193 (noting that a school reversed a decision to
ban a sixth grader from classes because she would not remove her headscarf,
pending a review of school policy).
199 See, e.g., Associated Press, Tennessee High School OKs Muslim Head Scarf,
FIRSTAMENDMENTCENTER.ORG (Jan. 16, 2005), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.
org/news.aspx?id=14697 (reporting that a public high school will now allow except-
ions from a school's ban on head coverings for Muslim girls in hijab, despite the
school's concern that, among other things, "other students would feel excluded, [and
a] negative image of Muslim [sic] would create safety concerns for" a complaining
student).
200 See United States' Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2, 5-6, Hearn v. Muskogee Pub. Sch. Dist. 020, C.A. No. CIV 03-598-S
(E.D. Okla. May 6, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/religdisc/muskmemo
.pdf; see also Reuters, Muslim Girl Suspended for Head Scarf, CNN.COM (Oct. 11,
2003), http://www.cnn.com/2003/EDUCATION/10/11/scarf.reut.
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September 11, 2003, to remove it because "hats, caps, bandannas,
plastic caps, and hoods" were prohibited by the dress code.2 °1
This is a good example of selective enforcement. That Hearn was
called out on the anniversary of the September 11th attacks was
hardly coincidental-school officials stated that they thought the
hijab would "frighten" other children." 2 Upon her refusal to
remove the scarf, Hearn was suspended twice: first for three
days, then another five.20 3 The U.S. Department of Justice filed a
complaint on her behalf,204 and the case was eventually settled
out of court, with an allowance for Hearn to wear hijab to
school. 26  The school was justified in suspending her under
Smith because it was acting under a neutral, generally applicable
law. It is notable that Oklahoma actually had passed a state
RFRA in 2000,206 restoring strict scrutiny, but even that had not
stopped the incident from occurring because the school did not
write a religious exemption into their dress code until the Hearn
settlement. The existence of the state RFRA would have
impacted the school's argument had the case been adjudicated.
There is little appellate case law on the issue of religious
dress, as some compromise is usually reached by the parties
outside of court. Much of the evidence of this problem remains at
the local level. This is a good sign because it proves that hijab
discrimination is not as prevalent in the United States as in
Europe, and most schools do their best to avoid it or rectify it.
When a thirteen-year-old Sudani Muslim immigrant was asked
to take off her hijab because of a school's "no hat" policy, the
school sent her a letter of apology for the humiliation she
201 See The Rutherford Institute, Religious Freedom under Siege in America: A
Special Report from The Rutherford Institute (June 8, 2004), http://www.rutherford.
org/articles-db/legal-features.asp?articleid=85.
202 See Stefanie Walterick, The Prohibition of Muslim Headscarves from French
Public Schools and Controversies Surrounding the Hijab in the Western World, 20
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 251,268 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
203 See id.; Rutherford Institute, supra note 203.
204 See Press Release, U. S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Files Complaint
Against Oklahoma School District Seeking to Protect Student's Right to Wear Head-
scarf to Public School (Mar. 30, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/March/04-
crt_195.htm.
205 See Associated Press, Muslim Student, Oklahoma District Settle Hijab
Lawsuit, FIRSTAMENDMENTCENTER.ORG (May 20, 2004), http://www.firstamend
mentcenter.orgnews.aspx?id= 13379.
21 See Haynes, supra note 193.
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suffered from being singled out.2" 7 This is a positive step, and if
the courts were to decide cases based on the analysis provided in
this Article, the country would continue towards a more
understanding, tolerant, and pluralistic paradigm. Accordingly,
students who wear the headscarf would no longer be subject to
humiliation because of their religious beliefs.
This shift in analysis is necessary because the lack of post-
Smith protection at the state level still allows for some grossly
unjust punishments to be taken against students. A junior at a
public high school in Plattsburgh, N.Y., was sent to in-school
suspension-a "solitary confinement" during which he studied in
the library without any instruction from teachers or participation
in extracurricular activities-for seventy-three days for wearing
a red headband that was a rite of passage within his Native
American religious beliefs."" Lawyers from a civil rights group
pressured the school into letting him back into class with the
headband." 9 While the problem was eventually resolved, this is
a highly disproportionate punishment just for a student's
expression of his religious beliefs. Although they are not adults,
students are not required to leave their constitutional rights "at
the schoolhouse gate."210 In a case that would not even pass
muster under the French law, a Jewish student in a Mississippi
high school was asked to remove his Star of David necklace
because the school considered it a "gang symbol"-the school
capitulated and allowed a religious exemption once the American
Civil Liberties Union intervened on his behalf.211
A new legal standard would preclude these events from
initially occurring. School actions like the above could chill
certain students from wearing headscarves if they are on the
fringe-for example, there are girls who would like to wear hijab
as an expression of their religious and cultural heritage but do
not feel that they are required by their religion.212 This is not
201 See Associated Press, Calif School Apologizes for Ordering Muslim Girl To
Remove Scarf, FIRSTAMENDMENTCENTER.ORG (June 27, 2007), http://www.first
amendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id= 18726.
208 See Haynes, supra note 193.
209 See id.
210 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
211 See Walterick, supra note 202, at 268-69.
212 See Isaacs v. Bd. of Educ., 40 F. Supp. 2d 335, 335-36 (D. Md. 1999) (granting
summary judgment to a school that used a "no hats" policy to force a student to
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acceptable. In a time when Muslim students are subject to
harassment, an Oklahoma school should not be able to call out a
student on the anniversary of September 11th and ask her to
stop wearing hijab-this sends the wrong message to students
who are biased against Muslims. The U.S. situation does not
even approach the amount of human rights abuses occurring in
France and Turkey, but we should be held to a higher standard
given our pluralistic history. Since September 11, 2001, Muslims
have been targeted for discrimination and acts of violence in the
U.S. A study by the Council on American-Islamic Relations
reports that most of the time, some identifiable Islamic symbol,
such as the headscarf, is what triggers acts of discrimination.213
For example, in a Florida case, a Muslim middle-school student
was called "Osama" and beaten with a belt because classmates
identified her as Muslim due to her headscarf.214 Allowing
schools to tell students that they must take off the scarf to
protect other students sends a troubling message to bullies.
B. The Solution
Employment Division v. Smith covers the constitutionality of
religious exemptions. By classifying student religious dress
issues under generally applicable policies as "hybrid" claims, a
case can get out from under Smith and back to the strict scrutiny
test.215 In Smith, the court harmonized its holding with earlier
cases such as Wisconsin v. Yoder,216 in which the Court held that
Amish parents could be granted an exemption from compulsory
education laws that would require them to send their children to
school until age sixteen, in contravention of their religious
beliefs,217 by explaining that they were hybrid claims that
invoked something more than just religious freedom.18 Yoder,
explained the majority, dealt with not only a First Amendment
remove a multicolored African headwrap that she wore to honor her cultural
heritage).
213 See Baker, supra note 30, at 351 (suggesting that government policies such
as the Patriot Act help to fuel fear and hatred of Muslims).
214 See Walterick, supra note 202, at 269.
215 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990), superseded by
statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
216 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
217 Id. at 234.
218 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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religious claim, but also a claim for parental authority to direct a
child's education,219 which was deemed a constitutional right in
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and
Mary.220
The claim of a student wishing to wear a religious symbol to
school can be considered a hybrid claim, invoking both the First
Amendment right to free exercise and the First Amendment right
to freedom of speech. 221 For this reason, if a case regarding hijab
or another religious symbol should ever reach the Supreme
Court, the Court should require the school to grant the student a
religious exemption. Alone, either claim would fail-students do
not have an unlimited right to freedom of expression in schools,222
and they do not have the right to a religious exemption from a
generally applicable policy.223 When taken together, however, the
claim should prevail, just as in Yoder. The parental right to
make decisions about their children's education does not extend
to granting an exemption from sending their children to school
for secular reasons-laws compelling attendance until age
sixteen continue to exist. When the religious claim is added,
however, it strengthens the argument enough that the exemption
is granted. So too should the right to free expression bolster the
right to religious exercise when it comes to the wearing of a
religious symbol.224 In France and Turkey, hijab is banned
precisely because of its political symbolism, so in those countries,
this hybrid argument would fail. In the U.S., however, the
right to freedom of political speech, even in the student context,
was explicitly upheld in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,225 in which a student wore a black
armband in protest of the Vietnam War.226 Another potential
hybrid argument is one for parental rights, like in Yoder. While
part of France's and Turkey's rationales for their bans is to
219 See id.
220 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
221 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
222 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
223 See supra text accompanying note 193.
224 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 (noting the Court's history in deciding hybrid
free speech and free exercise claims).
225 393 U.S. 503.
226 Id. at 513-14.
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prevent parents from forcing students to wear hijab, U.S.
constitutional law supports the right of parents to influence their
children's religious beliefs.227
Once it is established that a hijab claim is a hybrid claim,
the next step is to apply strict scrutiny. While the hijab ban in
Turkey passed a Sherbert-style test in the ECHR in Sahin, even
a generally applicable and neutral ban on coverings should fail a
similar test in the U.S. if it burdens religious believers. The first
question is whether there is a compelling interest in asking
students to remove hijab. Sahin held that there was, but in
Turkey, as well as in France, the hijab itself is considered a
threat to public order and gender equality. These concerns
simply do not exist in America; there is no threat of
fundamentalist Islam taking over, nor is there a risk that
significant numbers of women will feel pressure to wear the hijab
once they see others do so. Our principle of secularism is not as
extreme as lafcitd, so that argument would likewise fail the
compelling interest prong.228 This explains why a ban on hijab or
religious symbols in general would fail strict scrutiny, but when
it comes to a neutral law requiring all head coverings to be
removed, something like curbing gang activity in the school
context would be considered a compelling interest.229
The question then becomes whether the school's policy is
narrowly tailored to that interest-enough to curb gang activity
in a way that allows for the most freedom of religious expression.
If it is speculative for Turkey and France to assume that allowing
peaceful women like Leyla Sahin to wear headscarves will lead to
a wave of fundamentalist Islam, it would be equally speculative
for U.S. schools to argue that head coverings should be banned
227 See Baker, supra note 30, at 360-62 (analogizing the headscarf situation to
Yoder, noting that, as the Amish argued regarding school attendance, "Muslim
parents may also claim that forcing their daughter to remove her headscarf causes
her to forego a practice that is essential to her development in the faith and
integration into her community"); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (holding that statute requiring
school attendance may not "unreasonably interfere[] with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control"
and that states must thus allow parents to opt for parochial school for their
children).
228 See supra text accompanying note 178.
229 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502-03, 507, 512-13 (2005)
(discussing curbing gang activity in prisons as a compelling interest); id. at 547-48
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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due to gangs in cases where, like Sahin, the students wearing
them have not had any violent tendencies or problems with the
school.230 Gang symbols are easily distinguishable from religious
garb, and students who wear such garb should not be burdened
unless a school can show actual evidence that, for example, a
local gang is using a Star of David as its symbol. The solution
proposed in the Hearn settlement order is a good one-if a
student wants to wear a head covering with religious meaning,
his or her parents can submit an application to the school board,
and the student can be granted a temporary religious exemption
pending its review.231 This is an elegant solution that provides
the appropriate, narrowly tailored response to the threat of gang
activity. Another constitutional solution would be to analyze
hijab cases under the Tinker test, which governs freedom of
expression generally in the schools. This would require a
showing of "facts which might reasonably have led school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities"232 before asking someone to
remove the hijab-something that the Sahin court failed to
consider.
CONCLUSION
It is counterintuitive to defend headscarf bans on the basis of
gender equality. These bans demean women by suggesting that
females are highly susceptible to the influence of
fundamentalists or are incapable of thinking for themselves, and
furthermore, that such women outnumber those who make a
carefully considered personal choice to wear the headscarf.
Because of these bans, women will be faced with an ultimatum to
choose between wearing headscarves and completing their
230 For example, in a Canadian case, the court took into account the fact that a
student had never had disciplinary problems in ruling that the government violated
his rights by not allowing him to wear his Sikh ritual knife, or kirpan, to school. See
Multani v. Comm'n Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006 1 S.C.R. 256, paras. 41,
57 (Can.). There, of course, the knife is a greater danger than simply the wearing of
a headscarf alone.
21 See Consent Order at 3, Hearn v. Muskogee Pub. Sch. Dist., C.A. No. CIV 03-
598-S (E.D. Okla. May 2004), available at www.usdoj.gov/crtlreligdischearn_consent
_decreefinal.pdf. Per the order, the school board agrees to approve all such applicat-
ions unless it finds that the religious beliefs are not "sincerely held" or that the
exemption would "cause a material danger to safety." See id.
232 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
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educations or even remaining in their respective countries.
Moreover, these bans can act as a gateway to other human rights
abuses-including lack of access to education, suspensions from
jobs, and other forms of detainment-inflicted on women, who
are so often the most vulnerable to human rights attacks in the
first place. Hijab cases as extreme as those seen in Turkey and
France do not generally arise in the U.S., but it is frustrating
that the freedom to wear such an important religious article is
even an issue here; no student should ever be asked to remove
her hijab. Training for school officials should educate them on
the meaning of items like the headscarf, so that they understand
how humiliating it is for a young girl to have to take it off or how
upsetting it would be to have to choose between that and leaving
school. This education, along with the legal paradigm provided
in this Article for U.S. courts, would curb the use of neutral laws
against bandanas or hats against these students. School is
where students should learn about tolerance and pluralism,
which are great aspects of the diversity of the United States.
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